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disappeared from either the occasional reality or more frequent cultural perception of 
legal advocacy. Modern linguistic descriptions of advocacy therefore offer the prospect 
of showing what stylistic characteristics are actually involved; which techniques, if any, 
have been retained from the earlier rhetorical tradition; and how residual features have 
been adapted to fit the modern structures and contemporary style of legal proceedings. 
Current practice: style, moves and event structure 
In the course of an analysis of a corpus of modern Crown Court jury trials, the British 
linguist Chris Heffer describes the role of an advocate, at least in criminal trials, in a 
manner that contrasts markedly with the role we infer from the Burke extract above: 
The counsel is above all a strategist engaged in acts of persuasion: persuading the jury of 
the guilt or innocence of the defendant: convincing the judge of the legal admissibility or 
otherwise of an item of evidence; coercing the witness into answering in a certain fashion. 
(Heffer 2005: 95) 
The contrast with Burke here is not only between high-flown public monologue 
and strategic effort to engage with the jury in order to persuade them. It is also to do 
with an organisational rather than oratorical emphasis, requiring orchestration of the 
voices of others as much as projection of the advocate’s own voice. And as in other 
situations, speaking cannot be disconnected from listening. A modern trial will also 
involve long periods during which the advocate listens, taking material into account 
in anticipation of making a response later rather than speaking straight away – hence 
the theatrical metaphor often invoked in relation to legal trials of a play consisting of 
a series of acts. 
Advocacy is not just a texture of eloquence. Rather, it operates at a number of levels: 
there is the immediate stylistic level of choosing appropriate words and sentence 
structures to match the needs of courtroom interaction and expectations of relevant 
addressees; there is a speech act level calling for choices whether, and with what 
strength, to assert, ask questions, request clarification, object, exhort; there is a level 
of more complex discourse moves including crafted monologues, taking witnesses 
through their evidence, and interacting with opposing counsel and the judge(s); and 
there is the macro-strategic level of managing the trial’s overall, combined narrative 
and expository schema (which we explore in Unit D3, D4 and D5). 
INTERPRETING LEGISLATIVE TEXTS A6 
Few issues are more important in language and law than how meanings are given to 
written legal texts. In this unit, we show how emphasis in law on singular, correct 
interpretation differs from the descriptive and explanatory approach adopted in 
linguistics. In Unit B6, we extend this discussion by considering the reasoning processes 
DOI: 10.4324/9781315436258-6 
A6  26 I N T R O D U C T I O N :  K E Y  C O N C E P T S  
used in ‘construction’ (i.e. legal interpretation) to arrive at the meaning of problematic 
words and phrases in texts whose legal effect depends on their legislative purpose, not 
only on the meaning of individual words or grammatical relations between them. 
Legal interpretation as a specialised approach 
When we interpret utterances in everyday conversation or casual reading, we pay 
attention both to linguistic cues to meaning (e.g. choice of words) and to contextual 
cues as regards speaker intention. Legal approaches to meaning follow everyday 
strategies in interpretation, but in different ways. Three differences are significant: 
1	 Legal interpretation (often referred to as construction, from the word construe) 
takes a normative approach to attributing meaning. It ascribes singular, correct 
legal meanings by deciding meaning where there is doubt or disagreement. 
2	 The process of ascribing a meaning, which occurs spontaneously in everyday 
communication, often takes place through an explicit process of argument. The 
legal interpreter, usually a judge, takes into account not only linguistic meaning, 
but also legal considerations such as the purpose of the relevant legislation. 
3	 In litigation, legal wording may be tested in an adversarial setting. Common-law 
proceedings allow alternative interpretations to be argued, but require courts to 
follow specialised interpretive procedures in arriving at a legally correct outcome. 
This specialised approach to interpretation in law can make the process baffling to 
someone who insists that natural language processing is always an instantaneous and 
spontaneous process. 
Disputes over meaning 
Although legal language is drafted as precisely as possible, courts often find themselves 
having to decide the legal meaning of disputed words before they can apply the law. 
In a world of alternative understandings of facts, ideas and values, as well as differing 
preferences as regards behaviour, law is often relied on as the social institution to ‘fix’ 
– in both senses of ‘define’ and ‘resolve’ – contested concepts in a society. Think, for 
example, of what words such as marriage, extremist, indigenous, traditional, terrorist or 
life mean. Inevitably, questions arise regarding what concept or concepts such words 
denote; what range of characteristics or behaviour they subsume; and how they are to 
be understood in different contexts of use. Those questions are amplified when the 
society in which the words are used experiences major change in terms of technology 
or values. 
Interpretive difficulties arise not only with individual word meaning, but from the 
linguistic contexts in which the words occur. Syntactic ambiguity, uncertainty created 
by punctuation, collocation with other words in a list, combination with other words 
using the alternative connectives and versus or, and the grammatical scope of added 
modifiers: all these, individually or in combination, can create local interpretive 
difficulty. 
For instance, if a will provides that money should be given to ‘charitable institutions 
and organisations’, the question arises as to precisely which people, conducting what 
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kinds of activity, constitute an institution or an organisation; this question is tied to 
what kinds of activity are charitable. These are matters of lexical meaning. But the 
question whether, under the will, donations can only be made to organisations that 
are charitable, or whether it is only the ‘institutions’ that need to be charitable – and 
whether donations must be made to both kinds of body or only either one of them – 
are different kinds of question: these are questions to do with how the already 
problematic words are configured into phrases and sentences, and how those phrases 
and sentences should be interpreted in context. 
Many interpretive difficulties in law nevertheless gather around contested individual 
words. Consider the following example: 
❏	 A UK case concerned with Hindu cremation (R (Ghai) v. Newcastle City Council 
[2010]) addressed the problem that cremation of human remains could lawfully 
take place only within a building. Hindu beliefs required, by contrast, that 
cremation should occur in a place where sunlight can fall directly on the body as 
it is cremated. Did a place for cremation consisting of roofs supported on pillars, 
with low walls and a connecting balustrade, satisfy the requirement of being a 
‘building’? 
A question of interpretation of this kind is hardly rare, given the vagueness, polysemy 
and contextual variation in meaning of many if not most words. Hutton (2014) offers 
an analysis of a large number of such word-interpretation issues, chosen from cases in 
a number of jurisdictions. Was a racing pigeon a pigeon? Whether two deaths in the 
same incident were coinciding. Whether a Jaffa cake is a biscuit. Did a wiretap constitute 
a search? Is the Cherokee nation a foreign state in relation to the United States? Whether 
a post-operative transgender woman is a woman for the purpose of marriage. 
Interpretive issues in law, as can be seen in these examples, can arise in relation to 
different word classes. Problems are not confined to nouns, but also occur with verbs 
(to murder, to associate with), adjectives (alive), and adverbs (foreseeably, forthwith), 
as well as phrases rather than single words (e.g. best endeavours, in the vicinity). Further, 
because law governs virtually all areas of activity (health, family, commerce, crime, 
sport, etc.), problems of word and phrase meaning are not restricted to a particular 
semantic field. An English prosecution of prostitutes who invited their customers from 
behind windows and from an upstairs balcony, for example, turned on whether they 
were soliciting ‘in the street’. A US case discussed by Schane (2006: 38–9) turned on 
whether matching skirts and blouses were ‘ladies’ dresses’ for the purpose of a lease 
protecting the exclusive right of a retail store to sell ‘ladies’ dresses, coats and suits’ 
within a particular building. 
Uncertainty of meaning 
Words have a number of dimensions of meaning. These range from what concept 
or concepts the word denotes and what class of entities it can refer to through to 
connotations and other kinds of personal association. The full extent of a word’s 
meaning varies between situations and language users. But because of the kind of 
judgments law is called on to make, it is the scope of word meaning that presents the 
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most persistent legal difficulty: is X (a reported fact) a member of a (legally stated) 
superordinate class Y? To understand how fundamental this question is in law, we need 
to consider the sense relation of hyponymy and the concept of inclusion it conveys. 
The so-called classical model of categories, often associated with Aristotle but 
reflected in modern semantic theories such as Katz and Fodor’s (1963) system of 
semantic features, suggests that category membership is a matter of essential attributes 
(or necessary and sufficient conditions). For something to be a bird, it must be animate, 
not human, have wings and a beak, make a nest, lay eggs, and so on. The resulting 
system of categories has clear boundaries but also allows anomalies: birds that cannot 
fly or that lay eggs on the ground, etc. In contrast, Rosch’s (1978) psychological theory 
of prototypes proposed fuzzier categories that allow for different statuses of 
membership, based on goodness-of-exemplar (GOE) characteristics. Her prototype 
approach, subsequently developed in psychology and cognitive linguistics, results in a 
spread of category members ranging from core exemplars through to marginal, 
borderline cases. While a robin might (in some cultures) be a prototypical bird, an 
ostrich is less representative of the category. This is not because it lacks the essential 
attribute of flight, but because it is a less frequently encountered example of the 
category: informants typically mention it later when listing members of the category 
and verify its membership of the category slower in experiments. 
These alternative models of categories come into play in law in interesting ways. First, 
because laws are enacted as general provisions to be applied in varied circum stances, 
legal interpretation is almost continuously concerned with testing the fit between 
general concepts and individual persons, facts, and circumstances. In disputed cases, 
courts rule on whether borderline instances fall one side or the other of a cate gory 
boundary. What, for example, are a medical patient’s needs: do certain resources or 
treatments come within the meaning of needs or not? Hard legal cases are often con ­
cerned, among other things, with whether low goodness-of-exemplar entities should 
enjoy rights (or be required to fulfil obligations) associated with a category to which they 
appear marginal, or whether an action at the periphery of a category falls within that 
category for the purpose of a particular law. By deciding which side of a categorical line 
something falls, legal judgments assign to peripheral instances legal consequences 
seemingly more suited to dichotomous, or clear-cut, boundaries between categories. 
One widely discussed legal example illustrates the complexity. What types of moving 
machine can be a vehicle? Conceptually prototypical vehicles, such as cars, move along 
roads. But other exemplars show different degrees of closeness to the prototype: from 
tractors and ambulances, through roller skates and buggies, tapering to a periphery of 
candidates including aeroplanes. Deciding, in relation to a public park that forbids 
vehicles, whether someone riding a bike, driving a lawnmower or entering by 
ambulance to assist an injured person is guilty of an offence depends in part on how 
the word vehicle is construed. Yet enforcement of an adverse judgment may involve 
penalties suited to more uniform membership of or exclusion from the category. 
Difficulties surrounding vehicle have been at issue in a number of legal cases 
(including at least one about aeroplanes). Seemingly inspired by one of those cases (the 
US Supreme Court case McBoyle v. United States (1931)), the English legal theorist 
H. L. A. Hart discussed a hypothetical legal rule, No vehicles in the park, in his The 
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Concept of Law (1994 [1961]: 126–30). Hart argued that legal rules are formulated in 
general categories provided by ordinary language, but those categories, stated without 
reference to context, cannot be ‘closed’ in relation to the variety of possible facts. There 
will instead be a ‘penumbra of uncertainty’ at any given category’s borderline, such 
that a kind of open texture emerges when general classifying terms are confronted with 
particular facts. (A theoretically contrasting, but not incompatible, discussion of vehicle, 
from a cognitive semantic perspective, can be found in Croft and Cruse (2004: 92); see 
also our discussion of legal problems associated with translation of vehicle in Unit C10.) 
Figurative imagery used in legal discussion of meaning 
Use of words and phrases such as ‘open texture’ and ‘penumbra’ to characterise word 
meanings and categories is figurative. Hutton (2014: 26–9) examines use of such
figurative language in judicial reasoning, especially in frequent appeals to binary
oppositions in determining a word’s scope. 
The term ‘scope’ itself, Hutton points out, is a visual-spatial metaphor. Below a top-
level contrast between ‘literal’ or ‘plain’ meaning and ‘purposive’ styles of adjudication 
(which we consider in Unit B6), a number of metaphorical contrasts are commonly 
invoked. One contrast, Hutton shows, depicts meaning as conceptual space: ‘narrow’ 
meanings contrast with ‘broad’, ‘wide’ or ‘expansive’ ones. Another trope involves
degree of permissiveness: ‘strict’, and ‘restrictive’, meanings contrast with ‘liberal’
ones. The ‘letter’ is contrasted with the ‘spirit’ of a text’s meaning. ‘Ordinary’ and 
‘natural’ meaning is contrasted with ‘forced’, ‘strained’ or ‘artificial’ interpretation. 
Through mobilisation of such conceptual contrasts, an entity may be judged to ‘fall 
within’ or ‘fall outside’ a legal category. So, a wide meaning of vehicle might include a 
power-assisted bike or trolley, whereas a narrow meaning might exclude those modes 
of locomotion. A strict interpretation of tomato might insist it is a fruit, while a liberal 
meaning might acknowledge common reference to tomatoes as vegetables. 
In law, a range of factors are taken into consideration in deciding word meaning. 
An 1890s US case concerned with what a tomato was found that trade usage did not 
differ materially from popular usage; and dictionary definitions (used as an aid to 
memory and understanding) did not lend support to the idea that tomatoes were fruit. 
How tomatoes are consumed also suggested they were vegetables, and the court decided 
to give the word that ‘ordinary’ meaning (Hutton 2014: 80–3). The matching skirts 
and blouses case referred to above also drew on extrinsic evidence, including
commercial usage and evidence of practices in the relevant trade. The skirts and
blouses were not dresses, and there had been no violation of the covenant; but the 
vendor was required to price the two garments individually to reflect this, and not to 
compel customers to buy a matching set (Schane 2006: 39). 
In the Hindu cremation case, Lord Neuberger emphasised that while the meaning 
of building inevitably depends on context: 
it would not be right to take a somewhat artificially narrow meaning of the word, and 
then see whether the context justifies a more expansive meaning. It is more appropriate 
to take its more natural, wider meaning, and then consider whether, and if so to what 
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A number of the terms and contrasts that we have seen are used to characterise legal 
meaning are in play here, alongside the semantically vague adjectives ‘right’ and 
‘appropriate’ (which cut across procedural, legal and moral vocabularies). Lord 
Neuberger’s conclusion was that building should be given ‘its natural and relatively wide 
meaning’, such that Mr Ghai’s wishes in relation to cremation could be accommodated 
within the relevant regulations. 
This approach may appear to make the interpretive process vague, especially as 
English courts are not obliged to repeat the construction of undefined words from 
earlier cases, or reflect how the same word is used in other areas of legislation (though 
they often do). The purpose of confining cremations within buildings differs in obvious 
ways from, for example, the aim of the Theft Act 1968 (where building is also defined 
and has been tested in numerous cases). The Theft Act highlights a combination of 
specificity and contextual variability required in legal construction of word mean­
ing. In s. 9(3), building is defined to include ‘an inhabited vehicle or vessel, and shall 
apply to any such vehicle or vessel at times when the person having habitation in it 
is not there as well as at times when he is in’. It is as much legal purpose as closeness 
to prototype that subsumes an uninhabited waterborne vessel within the meaning of 
building but still finds a partly sideless room with a roof problematic. 
Word meaning in context 
Reference in legal interpretation to purpose (e.g. as communicated by the long title of 
a legislative act; see Thread 3) is a reminder that although words function as 
concentrated nodes of meaning, they are shaded or modulated on any occasion of use 
by other factors. Those factors include: the other words around them (co-text); previous 
instances of the same word elsewhere in the same discourse; the situation in which 
they are used; and background knowledge likely to be drawn on by an interpreter. If 
we are to understand how word meanings are used and contested in legal settings, 
therefore, it is necessary to situate interpretive disputes in both the legislative text 
around the word and also in how we inevitably draw selectively on surrounding, 
contextual information. 
A7 THE VOCABULARY OF LEGAL POWER 
In this unit, we examine the relationship between language, law and power, a 
connection we touch on in different ways throughout the book. Here, we address the 
specific question whether legal concepts merely describe, actively give effect to, or 
obscure social power. First, we introduce two key concepts at the intersection between 
any society’s political and legal spheres: power and order. Then we explain why use of 
such words is difficult to disentangle when thinking about legal language. Finally, we 
examine how language use may suggest different possible relationships that law can 
create between power and order. 
DOI: 10.4324/9781315436258-7 
